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REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE:

PANKRATZ V DISTRICT COURT

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the first amendment as it relates to the freedom of the press, I it has
stated that the protection is not absolute. 2 In its analysis, the Court will look
to the rights implicated by the individual problem presented and the way in
3
which they relate to the affected public interest.
4
The concept of a reporter's privilege, not recognized at common law,
has only developed in recent years. The privilege presents a conflict between
the importance of newsgathering and the right of the public to be informed
as opposed to the duty to be a witness and the authority of the court to
5
compel a witness' attendance and exact his testimony.

This unresolved conflict has resulted in a trifurcated development of
legal solutions. This comment will examine the three major approaches to
the problem of reporter's privilege as they relate to the case, Pankratz v. Dis6
trict Court.
I.

THE FACT SITUATION

In December 1978, a citation of contempt was issued for Robert C.
Ozer,7 Special Deputy District Attorney for the 1978 Statutory Grand Jury.
An amended citation alleged, inter aha, that Ozer had violated rule 6.2 of the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 41(e) of the Local Rules of
Practice of the District Court of the Second Judicial District8 by disclosing
information and details of the grand jury proceedings to Howard Pankratz,
a reporter for the Denver Post.
In January 1979, a subpoena duces tecum adtestifcandum was served on
Pankratz commanding him to appear before the court, give testimony, and
produce all documents related to the alleged meeting with Ozer.
Pankratz moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the requested information, which had never been published, was confidential and
that the enforcement of the subpoena would represent an invasion of his
constitutional rights. 9 Pankratz also asserted that the prosecutor had not
1. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1971); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
2. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 147 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
3. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1971).
4. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton's rev. ed. 1961).

5. Id.
6. 609 P.2d 1101 (Colo. 1980).
7. In re Robert C. Ozer and the 1978 Statutory Grand Jury, No. CR-1 1603 (Dist. Ct.
Colo., filed December 13, 1978) (complaint for contempt).
8. Both rules pertain to the requirement of secrecy in grand jury proceedings.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
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exhausted the alternative sources available to him," ° and had failed to show
a compelling state interest to justify the chilling effect which enforcement of
the subpoena would have upon newsgathering and freedom of the press. In
his affidavit, Pankratz admitted interviewing Ozer, but swore that the establishment of a confidential relationship was a condition precedent to that interview.
In February 1979, Judge Edward C. Day denied Pankratz' motion on
the ground that there was no shield law in Colorado which would excuse a
reporter from responding to a valid subpoena."1 The court held that there
was no support for the claim of such privilege according to well-settled rules
regarding first amendment reporter privileges.' 2 In the absence of a statutory privilege, Pankratz would qualify as a witness.1 3 Accordingly, when a
reporter has been an observer or participant in wrongful or criminal conduct, he must respond to a valid subpoena to testify or to produce documents relating to that transaction. He possesses no special privilege and is
14
considered to be in "the same shoes as an ordinary citizen."
Judge Day also examined Pankratz' balancing argument and found the
state interest sufficiently compelling to burden Pankratz' first amendment
rights since he was the only witness present during the entire interview.' 5
The court stated that the testimony of Pankratz went to the heart of the
allegations against Ozer and, therefore, all the available evidence must be
produced. The court rejected the claim that enforcement of the subpoena
would have a chilling effect on subsequent newsgathering activities.
Pankratz successfully moved to stay the proceedings. He then filed a
Petition for Relief in the Nature of Prohibition with the Colorado Supreme
Court. ' 6 In April 1980, the Supreme Court of Colorado discharged the rule
to show cause why the subpoena should not be quashed, and stated that,
under the circumstances of this case, there was no constitutionally based reporter's testimonial privilege. Justice Dubofsky did not participate. Justice
Rovira, specially concurring, stated that while he agreed with the result, he
would apply the three-pronged test promulgated in the dissent of Justice
Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes.17 That is, there must be probable cause to
believe that the reporter has information that is clearly relevant; such infor10. Gregory Fasing, staff attorney for the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, was present during only part of the interview. Affidavit of Fasing, In re Ozer and the 1978 Statutory Grand
Jury, No. CR- 11603 (Dist. Ct. Colo., filed December 13, 1978) (complaint for contempt).
11. Judge Day also heard a motion filed by Ozer to dismiss both the citation and the
amended citation and a motion of the Special Prosecutor to file the amended citation. The
motions of Ozer were denied; the motion of the Special Prosecutor was granted.
12. Pankratz v. District Court, No. CR- 11603 (Dist. Ct. Colo., Feb. 1, 1979) (citing
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
13. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-101 (1973) states that "[ajll persons, without exception,
other than those specified in §§ 13-90-102 to -108 [not applicable to the instant case] may be
witnesses."
14. Pankratz v. District Court, No. CR-1 1603, slip op. at 8 (Dist. Ct. Colo., Feb. 1, 1979).
15. Id.
16. COLO. APP. R. 2 1(c). As a witness rather than a direct party, Pankratz alleged he had
no plain and speedy remedy at law. See, e.g., Weaver Constr. Co. v. District Court, 190 Colo.
227, 545 P.2d 1042 (1976); People ex rel.Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123, 69 P. 597
(1902).
17. 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972).
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mation cannot be obtained by alternative means; and there is a compelling
need for the information.
II.

CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

Wigmore developed a four-part test to justify recognition of privileged
communications.i The communications must "originate in a confidence
that they won't be disclosed;" 1 9 the confidentiality must be essential to the
relationship between the parties; the relationship must be one which is recognized by the community as being of great importance; and, the potential
injury to the relation must be greater than the benefit gained in litigation by
the disclosure of the information. No special evidentiary privilege for reporters was formally recognized at common law.
Federal 20 and state 2 l rules provide that no person has a privilege to
refuse to be a witness, to refuse to disclose any matter or to produce any
object or writing, or to prevent another from being a witness except as required by the state 22 or federal 2 3 constitution, rules promulgated by the
26
25
24
and common law.
Supreme Court of Colorado, state statutes,
Recognition of a privilege is in direct conflict with the underlying purposes of the rules of evidence. 27 The rules are the embodiment of the principle that "the public . . . has a right to everyman's evidence" unless
protected by common law or by statutory or constitutional privilege. 2 8 They
are to be followed to ensure the fair administration of justice and the procurement of truth which will provide for a just determination of a given
cause. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is "beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to
support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his
' 29
testimony whenever he is properly summoned."
The issue of a reporter's privilege was first raised at the state level; the
courts refused to recognize the need for any special treatment of representatives of the press. 30 In the first three cases presented to it by petition, the
31
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
18. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2286.
19. Id.
20. FED. R. EVID. 501.
21. COLO. R. EVID. 501.
22. CoLO. CONST. art. 2, §§ 7, 10, 18.
23. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V.
24. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 26.
25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973).
26. Set 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4.
27. See, e.g., COLO. R. EvID. 102.
28. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)(quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4,
§ 2192).
29. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)(quoting Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)).
30. See Exparte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297,
184 P. 375 (1919); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72,
70 S.E. 781 (1911); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y.
291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
31. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Murphy, No. 19604 (Sup. Ct. Colo.), cert denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961), noted in In re Goodfader, 45
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In the first case, Garland v. Torre,32 Judy Garland brought suit against
CBS for breach of contract and defamation. The civil action in defamation
stemmed from a story written by Marie Torre in which she credited a CBS
network executive with making statements that Miss Garland asserted were
false and damaging to her reputation. Miss Torre refused to divulge the
source of her story and claimed that compelled disclosure violated the freedom of the press guaranteed by the first amendment and the requirement of
a free society that there be an unrestricted flow of news. The lower court
held that the freedom of the press was not absolute. The information sought
went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim and, as such, there was no constitutional right to refuse to answer.
Again, in In re Murphy,33 an unpublished Colorado case, the reporter's
privilege was asserted and denied. The case arose as part of a disciplinary
proceeding against a Colorado lawyer 34 who, in a petition filed with the
Supreme Court, allegedly made defamatory statements against a former
Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. The attorney was accused of
giving the statements to a reporter prior to filing the petition. The reporter
refused to answer as to whether she had received a copy of the petition. The
Colorado Supreme Court compelled her testimony, holding that it was relevant and material to the state's case against the attorney.
The third case, State v. Buchanan,35 involved published interviews with
marijuana users. The student reporter was held in contempt after refusing
to disclose the identity of her source of information during a grand jury investigation. The court held that, in the absence of a state statute, there was
nothing in the state or federal constitution that would compel recognition of
the reporter's privilege.
The United States Supreme Court, in 1972, chose to address the reporter's privilege by granting certiorari in four cases36 consolidated for appeal in Branzburg v. Hayes." The first three cases 3 8 each involved grand jury
testimony by reporters who were subpoenaed because they were first-hand
observers of the alleged criminal conduct. The reporters asserted that they
had a constitutionally based privilege premised on the first amendment of
the United States Constitution. In each case, the lower courts held that
there was no absolute or qualified constitutional privilege that would accommodate a refusal to respond to the subpoenaes. The decisions were affirmed
by the Supreme Court.
Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392

U.S. 905 (1968).
32. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).

33. No. 19604 (Sup. Ct. Colo.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
34. People v. Gately, 147 Colo. 336, 363 P.2d 666 (1961).
35. 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
36. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Meigs (Ky. 1971) (unreported decision) (same factual
issue as Branzburg v. Pound); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
37. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
38. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Meigs (Ky. 1971) (unreported decision); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
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In the fourth case, 39 the reporter was subpoenaed to testify about interviews with members of the Black Panther Party rather than about observed
criminal conduct. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that,
absent compelling reasons for requiring the reporter's testimony, he was
privileged to withhold it. The Supreme Court rejected the finding of qualified privilege and also rejected, as burdensome to the judicial process, the
requirement that the government show a compelling need for the reporter's
40
testimony.
In support of their assertions of a constitutionally protected privilege,
the reporters cited, inter a/ia, the decisions reported in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 4 1 and Curtzs Pubhshing Co. v. Bulls, 42 which supported the principle
that official action that adversely affects first amendment rights must be justified by a compelling public interest. This had been the position taken by
43
the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell o. United States.
Branzburg v. Hayes was a five-four decision; the deciding, and somewhat
qualifying, vote was cast by Justice Powell who emphasized both the limited
nature of the Court's decision as well as the need to balance the individual
constitutional interests and societal concerns on a case-by-case basis. 44 The
majority opinion noted instances in which a qualified privilege would be
recognized 45 and, in dicta, suggested that Congress and the state legislatures
46
Jusaddress the problem by enacting federal and state press shield laws.
47
tice Douglas dissented on the ground that the privilege should be absolute.
In their dissent, 48 Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall promulgated a three-part test to apply in cases of this nature: 1) probable cause
must be established which demonstrates that the reporter has information
that is relevant to the alleged violation of the law; 2) the information sought
is not available from alternative sources; and 3) there must be a compelling
interest in the information.

III.

TRIFURCATED APPLICATION OF BR.4NZBURG

Branzburg v. Hayes stands as the leading case in the area of reporter's
privilege. Because of the Supreme Court's complex response to this problem,
however, the case has been applied in varying ways. Some courts have interpreted the majority opinion in a very narrow fashion. Others have given
greater weight to the concurring opinion and have used the balancing test
39. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40. 408 U.S. at 678.
41. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

42. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
43. 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
44. 408 U.S. at 709.
45. Id. at 707-08. The Court stated that some protections are recognized within the first
amendment. A privilege will be recognized if the grand jury investigation is not instituted or
conducted in good faith. There is also no justification for harassment of the press or purposeful
disruption of a reporter's relationship with his news sources. Grand juries must operate within
the limits of the first as well as fifth amendments.
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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proposed by Justice Powell. These cases further appear to give credence to
the dissent by proposing the application of the three-part test that requires
establishment of probable cause, use of available alternatives for procurement of the information, and establishment of a compelling interest in the
information. The third approach, as suggested in the majority opinion, requires a legislative response in the form of the "press shield laws." This trifurcated application of Branzburg has resulted in a three-pronged approach
may require furto the problem of reporter's privilege for which resolution
49
Court.
Supreme
States
United
the
by
consideration
ther
The first approach follows the majority's opinion in Branzburg. In a decision arising from a murder case, New York Times Co. o. Jascaletch,5° the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Branwburg and stated there is "no present authority in this Court that a newsman need not produce documents material to
51
In a second denial of rethe prosecution or defense of a criminal case."
porter Farber's petition for a stay of execution, Justice White repeated this
principle and also stated that there was no authority for the notion that "a
defendant seeking the subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances
52
before enforcement against newsmen will be had."
In Zurcher v. Stanford DailyS3 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a search warrant that authorized the search of a newsroom. The
Court rejected Stanford Daiy s argument that the warrant was overbroad because, in the course of a general or unspecified search, confidential information could be uncovered. Applying the logic of Branzburg, the Court stated
that it was unconvinced that confidential sources would disappear or that
54
the press would suppress news because of unwarranted searches.
55
Lower courts have also followed Branzburg. In Rosato v. Superior Court,
the California Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of constitutional law
and public policy, the argument that the press will be unable, without a
privilege, to obtain secret information is without merit. Generally, courts
for
find that when a reporter is an actual witness or participant in the events
56
which he has been subpoenaed to testify, there will be no privilege.

49. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971);
Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L.
REV. 18 (1969); Murasky, The journalist'sPrivilege. Branzburg andIts Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REV.
829 (1974); Nelson, The Newsmens' Pwilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources & Information,
23 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1971); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutionsand PriateLitigation, 58 CoLO. L. REV. 1198 (1970); Note, The Rights of SourcesThe CriticalElement in the Clash Over Reporter's Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202 (1979); Note, Reporters
and Their Sources. The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
50. 439 U.S. 1301 (1978).
51. Id. at 1302.
52. 439 U.S. 1317, 1322 (1978).
53. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
54. Id. at 564-65; see Teeter & Singer, Search Warrants in Newsrooms: Some Aspects of the Impact
of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 67 Ky. LJ.847 (1978-79); Note, ConstitutionalLaw--First Amendment Rights ofNewspaper Are Adequately Protectedby Search Warrant Requirement, 27 KAN. L. REV.
653 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law-First and Fourth Amendments Do Not Prohibit Use of Search
Warrants Against Newspapers, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1513 (1979).
55. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
56. Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
930 (1977); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973); In re
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A qualified privilege, however, has been recognized when the information possessed by the reporter was not relevant to the prosecution. 57 It has
also been allowed when the reporter did not actually witness any alleged
criminal act. 58 A qualified privilege will be recognized if the court finds that
the purpose of the subpoena was strictly to harass the news media, 59 or if the
information to be obtained is cumulative or available from additional
sources.

60

The second approach following Branzburg emphasizes the balancing test
used by the concurring opinion while strongly favoring the standards
promulgated in the dissenting opinion. In 1979, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia granted a motion to quash in UntedStates
v. Hubbard.6 1 A subpoena duces tecum was served on a reporter from the
Washington Post to produce his writings and materials concerning an FBI
search of the Church of Scientology. The court relied heavily on Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg62 and invoked the balancing test.
It held that there were alternative means to obtain the information concerning the pre-search briefing conducted by the FBI and that the testimony of
the reporter was not necessary for a fair resolution of the case.
The Florida circuit court, in Florida v. Silber,63 applied Justice Powell's
balancing test to determine that a criminal bribery defendant must establish
compelling interests that outweigh the broad first amendment privilege possessed by the press against compelled testimony and production of documents. The circuit court also applied standards which were very similar to
64
those of the dissent in Branzburg.
In Riley a. Chester,65 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the finding of civil contempt of the lower Pennsylvania court and recognized
a federal common law privilege to refuse disclosure of confidential sources.
The court held that criminal or civil litigants must show that the information sought can be obtained from no other source and that the information is
material, relevant, and necessary and goes to the heart of the litigant's claim.
Although the action was filed under federal law, the court cited the Pennsylvania Shield Law 66 (which provides for a reporter's privilege) because the
interests of the state and federal laws were congruent. 67 The court distinguished this civil action from the criminal case, Branzburg, yet recognized the
strength of Justice Powell's concurring opinion and adopted the balancing
test. The court also appeared, however, to apply the three-pronged test outFarber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert.
dented, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super.
460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
57. Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978).
58. Florida v. Hurston, 3 Media L. Rep. 2295 (1978).
59. Morgan v. Florida, 337 So. 2d 951, 956 (Fla. 1976).
60. United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976).
61. 5 Media L. Rep. 1719 (1979).

62. 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
63. 5 Media L. Rep. 1188 (1979).
64. Id. at 1189-90.
65. 5 Media L. Rep. 2161 (1980).
66. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon Supp. 1980).

67. 5 Media L. Rep. at 2166.
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lined in Justice Stewart's dissent. It found that there was no compelling
need for the testimony; there were alternative sources from which the evidence could be obtained; and the "information sought to be disclosed ap68
pears to have only marginal relevance to the plaintiff's case."
In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit extended, in United
States v. Cuthbertson,69 the principles promulgated in Ritey to criminal cases.
A contempt citation was issued against CBS for failure to produce notes and
out-takes from the show "60 Minutes" on which was shown a story on a fastfood franchise, Wild Bill's Family Restaurants. (A grand jury later indicted
the officers of the franchise for conspiracy and fraud.) The Third Circuit
held that CBS was required to produce, for in camera inspection, all film,
tapes, or transcripts of statements made by named prosecution witnesses and
by approximately 100 named franchisees or potential franchisees. The
Third Circuit upheld the contempt citation as it related to prosecution witnesses, but reversed the contempt order based on the disclosure of statements
made by non-witnesses. The court of appeals noted that Riley was "persua70
It further stated
sive authority" to extend the privilege to criminal cases.
that the privilege included both confidential sources and unpublished information. Applying the balancing test, the court found that the subpoena
must be valid and that the information sought must not be available from
alternative sources.
In October 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on
United States v. Criden. 71 The question decided in this case was whether a
journalist, summoned as a defense witness in a criminal proceeding, may
refuse to affirm or deny that she had a conversation with an individual who
had already publicly testified that the conversation occurred and that certain matters relevant to the judicial inquiry were discussed. The issue involved the credibility of the single self-avowed source rather than the source
of the reporter's information.
Factually, this case involved a charge of prosecutorial misconduct on
the part of representatives of the Department of Justice and the United
States Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. They were
accused of releasing information concerning the ABSCAM investigation to
the media. The defendants were seeking testimony from the reporter concerning the content of the conversation. The source and fact of the conversation had been stipulated to by the government.
The Third Circuit cited the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in
Branzburg and stated that the assertion of the privilege must be balanced
with the interest of the criminal litigant. The court further stated that it
must look to the materiality, relevance, and necessity of the information
sought. The moving party must show that the information cannot be obtained from alternative sources. After reviewing the circumstances of this
case, the court affirmed the decision of the district court and stated that the
68. Id. at 2168.
69. 6 MEDIA L. REP. 1545 (1980).

70. Id. at 1549.
71.

6 MEDIA L. REP. 1993 (1980).
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reporter's qualified privilege to refuse to disclose the contents of the conversation must yield to the defendant's need for the material.
Although these cases are not totally persuasive, they may represent a
trend by which the standards of the concurring and dissenting opinions of
Branzburg are gaining credibility. It is possible that the time is right for further review by the Supreme Court.
The third approach to the problem of the scope of reporter's privilege
relates to the attempts by federal and state governments to enact press shield
laws. In the Branzburg decision, the Court stated that:
Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards
and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the
evil discerned and equally important, to refashion those rules as
experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in
leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to
fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems
with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and
72
press in their own areas.
At the time of this decision, seventeen states had passed shield law legislation. Today, there are twenty-six such statutes 73 that vary in the degree of
protection that they offer. Of the total, eleven provide only for a conditional
privilege that can be revoked under certain circumstances or by court order. 7 4 Some statutes, although appearing to confer an absolute privilege,
have been interpreted by the courts as conditional in cases involving criminal activity or grand jury proceedings. 7 5 Furthermore, if a reporter does
successfully assert the protection of a shield law, it can be circumvented by
72. 408 U.S. at 706.
73. ALA. CODE § 21-142 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150, .160 (1973); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 2-1733 (Burns 1968); Ky. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-.1454 (West Supp.
1979); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 7 67 .5a (1968);
MINN. STAT. § 595.021 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT.
§§ 2A.84A-21, -21a (Supp. 1978-79); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp.
1978-79); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510 (1975); 28 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 330 (Purdon Supp.
1978-79); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19-. 1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 (Supp.
1977).
74. States with statutes providing only a conditional privilege include Alaska, Arkansas,
Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
75. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied,

427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972), aJd,
266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super.
460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); Ammernan v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d
442 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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obtaining a search warrant.

California has amended the state constitution to include reporter's
shield provisions. This amendment provides for an absolute privilege as it
relates to the source of information and disclosure of unpublished information. The Colorado Legislature has not passed a shield law; several bills
were introduced in 1973 but all were unsuccessful. 77 None have been introduced since.
At the federal level, numerous attempts have been made to provide a
privilege to reporters. 78 The most recent effort came in reaction to the Stanford Daily case. 79 While initial attempts reflected a desire to include the concept of privilege, the form of the final bill may represent a compromise.8 0
It would appear that the trend is toward increased legislation. Whether
a substantive privilege is actually afforded through this effort, however, is
questionable. The shield statutes have been narrowly construed and may be
of limited help to either the informant or the reporter.

IV.

RATIONALE OF PANKRATZ V DIsTRIcT COURT

The issue to be resolved in Pankratz v. District Court was whether there
was a constitutionally based privilege that would protect the petitioner and
shield him from compliance with the subpoena issued by the district court.
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that, "under the circumstances of this
case" 8' and "apphed to the facts of this case,' '8 2 a privilege does not exist.
The circumstances and facts of the Pankratz case are very limited. Mr.
76. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); see text accompanying notes 52-53,
supra.

77. H.B. 1327, 49th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973); H.B. 1034, 49th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973);
H.B. 1016, 49th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973).
78. See, e.g., S. 1128, S. 318, S. 36, H.R. 7984, H.R. 5928, H.R. 3595, H.R. 2280, H.R.
1263, H.R. 717, S.J. Res. 8, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 3552, H.R. 18983, H.R. 16704, H.R.
16328, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 5146, H.R. 5003, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); S. 919,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); S. 2175, S. 2110, H.R. 5403, H.R. 5281, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929).
On June 14, 1973, a favorable report was given to the full committee by a subcommittee of
the House Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 5928, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This bill gave
journalists an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose to federal grand juries the identity of a
confidential source or the content of any confidential communication obtained in their professional capacity. The privilege was extended to civil and criminal federal trials but was conditional and could be revoked if the party seeking the information could show that it was relevant
and was not available from alternative sources. This bill was not passed.
H.R. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), offered reporters and publishers limited protection
from compulsory disclosure of news sources and information in federal and state courts. Known
as the News Source and Information Protection Act of 1975, hearings were held to discuss the
bill before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. The
bill was not passed by Congress.
79. H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), was approved by the Courts, Civil Liberties,
and Administration of Justice Subcommittee and sent to the full committee. H.R. 3486 requires federal and state authorities seeking materials in the possession of anyone engaged in first
amendment activity to obtain a subpoena. A search warrant may be used if the person holding
the materials sought is suspected of a crime or the materials are needed to prevent the immediate death or serious injury of a human being.
80. S. 115, H.R. 4181, S. 1790, and S. 1816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), were considered to
be broader in scope than H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
81. Pankratz v. District Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Colo. 1980) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
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REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

Pankratz, a newspaper reporter, was a first-hand observer of criminal conduct. Although he was not the only observer, the trial court found that he
was the one person who was present during the entire transaction. Pankratz
submitted an affidavit stating that the meeting had taken place with the
informant, Ozer, and confidential information had been exchanged. The
problem, therefore, was not the identity of the informant, but rather the
content of the unpublished information. Furthermore, the petitioner was
not refusing to respond to questions of the grand jury, as in Branzburg. Pankratz involved criminal proceedings, and it was the defendant in the criminal
trial who had allegedly violated the secrecy rules of the grand jury.
In refusing to recognize a privilege, the Colorado Supreme Court relied
heavily on Branzburg. Quoting Branzburg, the court found that when a reporter has witnessed a crime, there is no substantial question concerning the
existence of a privilege. "The crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest when witnessed by a reporter than
when they are not." ' 83 The court found further support in New York Times Co.
v. Jascalevzch ,84 which reaffirmed the Branzburg decision. The court held that
the public interest in law enforcement and effective grand jury proceedings
is greater than the burden placed on newsgathering.
The court rejected the cases cited by Pankratz as inapplicable to the
present situation. The first four cases 8 5 were civil, and therefore more appropriate vehicles for application of the balancing test. The fifth case 8 6 involved a crime that the reporter had not observed and for which the
testimony of the reporter would have been only remotely relevant.
In his concurrence 8 7 Justice Rovira agreed with the decision of the majority, but stated that he would have applied the three-pronged test and
would have emerged with the same result. That is, the testimony of the
petitioner went "to the very heart" of the charges against Ozer; the information, because Pankratz was the only witness to the entire transaction, could
not be obtained by alternative means; and the testimony was relevant to the
alleged violation of the law.
V.

IMPACT ON COLORADO LAW

The ultimate enforcement of the contempt citation against Howard
Pankratz will never be tested. On August 10, 1980, Judge Day responded to
a motion to quash the subpoena for deposition that was served on Pankratz
by vacating the exparte order for deposition. In applying rule 15 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Day held that a deposition could
only be taken if the witness were unable or unwilling to appear for trial.
Counsel for Pankratz, Walter Steele, assured the court that the witness
83. 408 U.S. at 692.
84. 439 U.S. 1317 (1978).
85. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee, 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Baker v. F & F Investment,
470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp.
1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
86. Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978).
87. Pankratz v. District Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Colo. 1980) (Rovira, J., concurring).
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would be present at trial. He was explicit in pointing out, however, that
while Pankratz would be present at the trial, he could not promise the court
that the witness would testify. The matter was set for trial.
On August 19, 1980, the district court heard a motion filed by Ozer in
which he stated that he had briefed Pankratz about indictments he planned
to seek from the grand jury. Ozer's action released Pankratz from his pledge
of confidentiality.
Judge Day found Ozer in technical contempt and proceeded to purge
the contempt and levy no fine or jail sentence. He dismissed the case and the
subpoenas that had been issued, including the one that would have compelled Pankratz to testify at the trial.
The decision in Pankratz represents only an initial step in the resolution
of the controversy over the reporter's privilege. It is a narrow holding and if,
in fact, the information was not available from another source, a valid decision. Certainly, the public is entitled to "everyman's evidence," particularly
in a criminal case.
It would appear, however, that a trend has developed that would support Justice Powell's proposed balancing test as well as the three-pronged
test of the dissent. Because it appears that the contempt citations in cases
like these will continue to be challenged, application of Powell's standards
would probably be no more time consuming than the lengthy and predictable appeals.88
The court in Pankratz was very specific in pointing out that the ruling
applies only to the facts presented to the court in that instance. This explicitly limited scope leaves many aspects of the question of reporter's privilege
unresolved. For example, will the court recognize a privilege if the information sought relates to the identity of the informant? Are the standards
presented by the court applicable to other types of hearings such as administrative or legislative committee hearings? Does the holding extend to all
newsgatherers? Must the activity of the reporter be within the scope of his
employment? Does it apply only to unpublished material? To what extent
would a press shield statute be accepted by the court? These are questions
that will remain unanswered until subsequently approved legislation or
other cases are presented to the court.
Joan HarcourtCady,

88. Interview with Carol Green, attorney for the Denver Post, August 11, 1980. Ms. Green
indicated that newspapers are, in many instances, requiring that a reporter obtain approval
from his or her editor before a request for the establishment of a confidential relationship with
an informant can be granted. This is sometimes done in the form of a written agreement which
limits the scope of the relationship to the time that a matter may be presented for litigation.
Ms. Green also indicated that since the Pankratz case, there has been a reluctance on the
part of public officials to disclose information. It would appear than an in-depth, sociological
study is warranted to test the hypothesis promulgated by the Supreme Court in Branzburg that
the flow of news to the public is not constricted by the failure to recognize a privilege for reporters.

